29 JUL 1959

Honorable Thomas E. Murray

STAT [redacted]

Dear Tom:

I found your letter of 6 July and the enclosed transcript of your statement on the "Meet the Press" broadcast of 5 July very informative, and have taken the liberty of forwarding it to some of my colleagues here in the Agency for their perusal.

Many thanks for making this available to us.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

STAT OSI/NED [redacted] DULLES:pam 20 Jul 59
STAT Rewritten: O/DCI [redacted] blp 28 Jul 59

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STAT (Letter as originally prepared concurred in by [redacted] STAT for AD/SI and by Mr. Amory.)

(EXECUTIVE)

Honorable Thomas E. Murray

STAT [redacted]

Dear Tom:

I found your letter of 6 July and the enclosed transcript of your statements on the "Meet the Press" broadcast of 5 July very informative.

By way of comment on the ideas expressed in your letter as to future wars, I would offer the following:

a. While the possibility of limited nuclear war should not be excluded, political and psychological inhibitions may well influence the actions of both sides in this area as in the area of unlimited nuclear conflict.

b. I would not discount too greatly the deterrent of our over-all nuclear posture upon Soviet willingness to commit local aggression. The Soviets could never be sure that we would not "up-the-ante" or that unlimited nuclear conflict could not develop, because of miscalculation, regardless of the fact that neither originally intended this outcome.

c. We would be inclined to be less cautious than you in feeling that the US is probably still ahead of the Soviets in atomic armament with respect to technology as well as numbers. They do not appear to have placed more emphasis on small weapons than we.

d. The problem of partial versus complete test suspension is a very complex one. Here again, however, I would add that there are political and psychological factors which may have just as much bearing on our posture as the purely military balance.

I appreciate having received your views on these matters.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

ORIGINATED BY
Assistant to Deputy Director/Intelligence (NSC)

CONCURRENCES:

STAT [redacted] 21 JUL 1959 [redacted] STAT

for Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence Deputy Director/Intelligence

STAT OSI/NED [redacted] DULLES:pam (20 July 1959)

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THOMAS E. MURRAY

July 6, 1959

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Allen:

The enclosed transcript of my statements on "Meet the Press" on July 5, regarding the Geneva test moratorium and our small nuclear weapons program, may be of interest.

I regret that my statements in regard to future wars were not as clear as they should have been. I was arguing against the assumption, which apparently controls American policy at the moment, that if there is a war in the future it will be unlimited nuclear war. This assumption is implicit in the whole policy of massive retaliation which is presently controlling.

My contrasting assumptions are two-fold. First, the possibility of armed conflict is inherent in the current international crisis. Second, an unlimited conflict with nuclear weapons is an absurdity and must be recognized as such by both parties.

Therefore I conclude to a middle position. If there is an armed conflict -- and it will be a nuclear conflict -- it must be a limited nuclear conflict.

Sincerely yours,

Tom

Thomas E. Murray

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DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1959

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WARNING FROM AN EXPERT

As consultant to Congress' joint atomic energy committee, Thomas E. Murray appeared on the TV program "Meet the Press" Sunday evening with an important warning to Americans.

Thomas E. Murray

Mr. Murray believes the Kremlin will kick up further limited wars, such as Korea, while fearing to start the all-out nuclear war which the United States is well prepared to fight.

Therefore, says Murray, we should stockpile tens of thousands of small nuclear weapons for these probable limited wars. That makes sense to us.

It also reminds us that the Geneva talks about banning nuclear weapon tests are still going on. There is considerable danger that the United States may buy British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's plan for a specified yearly number of inspections (say three or four) to "enforce" a permanent ban on all of such tests.

That would be no enforcement; and dropping all tests would hand Moscow a tremendous cold-war victory. How about our people at Geneva simply standing pat on President Eisenhower's plan, to abandon fallout-producing nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere, but go on with tests under ground and in outer space? And for our own safety, how about resuming underground and outer-space tests in a hurry, regardless of Red objections? The Russians are on the ball for war or peace; witness their alleged recovery of two dogs and a rabbit alive from their latest rocket.

MEET THE PRESS, JULY 5, 1959 - NBC TELEVISION

GUEST: Thomas E. Murray; MODERATOR: Ned Brooks; PANEL: Lawrence E. Spivak; Richard Wilson, Cowles Publications; John Finney, N. Y. Times; Marquis Childs, St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

BROOKS: Welcome once again to Meet the Press. Almost exactly a year ago the United States and Great Britain started negotiating with the Soviet Union on the banning of nuclear testing. These negotiations are still going on, but settlement still seems to be a long way off. Our guest today is Mr. Thomas E. Murray, who has attended some of the Geneva sessions as a consultant to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Over the years, Mr. Murray has played a leading role in the controversy over atomic testing. He was strongly opposed to the Administration's action of last October in suspending tests without waiting for action by the Soviet Union. Now, Mr. Murray, if you're ready, sir, we'll start the questions with Mr. Spivak.

SPIVAK: Mr. Murray, we've spent a year negotiating with the Soviet Union at Geneva on the question of banning nuclear tests. What do you think the United States and the free world have to gain by signing an agreement with the Soviet Union to end nuclear tests?

MURRAY: At the present time I don't see any advantage to the United States in signing such an agreement.

SPIVAK: Do you think then that we ought to pick our delegates up and come home?

MURRAY: Not necessarily. I think that we could continue negotiations, continue to talk. I am always in favor of trying to work out some arrangements that would be satisfactory to all parties and at the same time keeping national security in mind.

SPIVAK: Would you be willing at this time to sign any agreement with the Soviet Union to halt underground tests, for example, regardless of what inspection system they agreed to?

MURRAY: I would not.

SPIVAK: What about the proposal made by Mr. Macmillan?

MURRAY: The Macmillan proposal is the one that is being given greatest emphasis today in Geneva. The Macmillan proposal, I think, if it was adopted, would give the illusion of an inspection system, a token inspection system, without an actual, effective inspection system.

CHILDS: Mr. Murray, I'd like to carry Mr. Spivak's question a little bit farther and quote your language in your report in May to the Committee when you said that a complete stoppage of nuclear tests would be disastrous in the present state of our nuclear armament programs. Is this because Soviet Russia is so far ahead of us in atomic armament?

MURRAY: It stems from two reasons. One is the Soviet Union may be ahead of us in atomic armament. There's nothing that I know of that indicates that the Soviets are not up to us and ahead of us, particularly in the small weapons field. I made that statement because I have been advocating and still advocate a balanced

nuclear stockpile, a rational nuclear stockpile, a stockpile that would not only envisage weapons of mass destruction and weapons of annihilation, but small nuclear weapons that could be used to carry on limited nuclear war.

CHILDS: Well, it has also been said, Mr. Murray, that we have failed where the Russians have succeeded in getting the small nuclear warhead that will fit the international ballistic missile. Do you believe this is true?

MURRAY: We have not necessarily failed in this area. We have made some progress to get a small warhead for an intercontinental ballistic missile, but we have made very little progress in the small weapons field.

CHILDS: That includes the ICBM, the warhead that's essential for the ICBM?

MURRAY: I am not too familiar with the different kinds of warheads that will be used on the ends of ICBM's or IRBM's. But we have warheads in stockpile that could be used.

CHILDS: You followed this for seven years on the Commission and for the balance of the time with the Committee. Would you say that this lag, U. S. lag, was because of the economy and budget-balancing policies of the Eisenhower Administration?

MURRAY: I think this lag is due to two things. One is I think that technology has taken over, plus the budgetary considerations. Back in 1954, when the so-called "New Look" came into existence, was the time the situation started to change, and that is the time the policy was developed for massive retaliation. Massive retaliation became, and still is, as far as I know, the main objective of this country.

FINNEY: Mr. Murray, I'd like to go into the troublesome moral issues involved in nuclear armament and disarmament. You're known as one of the leading Catholic laymen in this nation. Do you see any conflict between your position on testing and the Pope's latest Encyclical urging the leaders of the world to try every approach to achieve peace and world unity?

MURRAY: I don't see any inconsistency, Mr. Finney.

FINNEY: You would favor, however, continued nuclear armament?

MURRAY: I would favor continued nuclear tests in the small areas, in the small fields. And when I talk about small weapons of course I mean weapons in the range of one kiloton and fractional kiloton.

FINNEY: Mr. Murray, you've been talking about these small weapons now for several years. Don't we have them?

MURRAY: We do not. We have some small weapons and we have some tactical weapons, but we haven't the tens of thousands of weapons that I have been urging and other people have been urging to put into stockpile.

FINNEY: Then I wonder if you could tell me this from your knowledge on the Commission and serving as consultant to the committee: What proportion of our weapons material is going into the big strategic weapons and what proportion into the small tactical weapons?

MURRAY: That's a difficult question to answer and it's a question that even if I had the answer I couldn't give it to you today on account of secrecy. But the great emphasis up to the Hardtack Series has been to develop more efficient big weapons, and bigger and bigger ones.

FINNEY: Mr. Murray, how in the world is the public going to consider this problem of small weapons if we're going to have so much secrecy around? Is there any reason for secrecy on this point?

MURRAY: I don't believe so. I think the difficulty that we're in today is the fact that we haven't taken the public into our confidence. We've had arguments and discussions in other fields of armament, in conventional armaments. We've had arguments, as you remember, about lack of ammunition in Korea and lack of ammunition in other areas; I believe that this small weapons area should be well publicized. The public should have some knowledge of what the situation is today.

WILSON: Mr. Murray, in many quarters in the government I think there has been a feeling for some time that an atomic war was probably impossible. In any event it was not an effective instrument of national policy because of mutual destruction which would be inflicted by the large bombs. Are you arguing that a nuclear war is a quite likely thing? Probable?

MURRAY: All-out nuclear war, no. I do not believe, by any stretch of the imagination, that we're going to face all-out nuclear war. I don't think it's the intention of the Soviets to carry on such a war. They're not putting weapons into stockpile in order to carry on wars of massive destruction. They don't stockpile weapons as we do, to prevent war and to wage peace. They stock weapons for use.

WILSON: Then you are assuming that there may be a nuclear war using small weapons; is that right?

MURRAY: I have no doubt that there will be.

WILSON: You have no doubt that there will be such a war?

MURRAY: I think so.

WILSON: Would you care to place a time limit on it?

MURRAY: No. No, I don't think so. I think that the question is that the Soviets recognize, as we do what the results of an all-out nuclear war would be, the devastation and the havoc and destruction, and perhaps finding ourselves both in the same grave. They have no intention of putting an end to history -- and that's what an all-out nuclear war would be.

WILSON: Well, how can you use the smaller weapons without having instantly the risk of the use of the larger weapons, in desperation?

MURRAY: There's no definite categorical answer that I could give to that. I suppose your question is directed to the argument that any use of nuclear weapons will lead to the use of bigger and bigger weapons and eventually to all-out war. I don't think that contingency will occur. I don't think that the Soviets, realizing what an all-out nuclear war means, would ever dream of carrying on an all-out nuclear war against the United States.

WILSON: But your point is -- is this correct? -- that if we were to have a limited nuclear war using the small weapons as you recommend, that we're not prepared for it.

MURRAY: We are not prepared for it today, and we ought to have that flexibility. I can't say that the use of small weapons would not lead to an all-out war. Neither can anyone say with certainty whether it will or will not. But I say this country should have the flexibility to fight any kind and all kinds of nuclear wars.

SPIVAK: When Pres. Eisenhower recently refused to rule out the possibility of a nuclear war if the Soviet Union tries to push us out of Berlin, do you think he was thinking in terms of small weapons or thinking in terms of the deterrent H-bomb?

MURRAY: I don't know what he was thinking about, Mr. Spivak.

SPIVAK: Well, do you think -- what I'm trying to get out is this, if you think we do not have enough small weapons to conduct a limited war he must know this too; then he couldn't have been thinking of a war of limited nature.

MURRAY: Not a nuclear war of limited nature, no.

SPIVAK: And you still believe that if a small war were started that it would not definitely result in an H-bomb war, particularly if atomic weapons are used?

MURRAY: It's a possibility, but I don't think a probability.

SPIVAK: Let me ask you this. Do you think it's possible for one nation to knock another nation out with H-bombs without really destroying itself, through fallout?

MURRAY: It all depends of course on how much material is used, how many megatons are used to destroy another nation.

SPIVAK: Well, let's take the number of bombs that this recent Holifield Committee brought out -- 263 bombs, I think. They thought about 50 million, or 49 million people in this country would be destroyed. Could the Russians, for example, drop enough bombs to destroy 50 million people without setting up a fallout that would destroy them?

MURRAY: Oh yes, I think so.

SPIVAK: You think they could?

MURRAY: Assuming the figures mentioned, they could. They would get some results from such an attack on us, but it wouldn't be, of course, in proportion to the result that we would get.

CHILDS: Mr. Murray, as you know, four years ago there were maneuvers in Louisiana involving small atomic weapons -- this was a test run, Operation Sagebrush -- and it was shown that twelve states would have been devastated, cities partially destroyed, and the surviving inhabitants completely affected by radioactivity. In the light of this how do you argue the possibility of limited atomic war?

MURRAY: Well, I argue because limited atomic war is the only rational war in the nuclear age that can be carried out today.

CHILDS: Well, would any country want to have a limited war fought in its territory if this is the consequence as was shown in Operation Sagebrush?

MURRAY: No country that I know would like to have a limited war fought in their country, no, but that doesn't necessarily lead to the fact that an all-out war is inevitable.

CHILDS: But you would accept the consequences of a limited atomic war even though, as Operation Sagebrush showed, they're pretty devastating?

MURRAY: I'm not too familiar with the Sagebrush results, but I think that I would.

CHILDS: You believe this is a possibility in the world today, that kind of war?

MURRAY: An all-out war?

CHILDS: No, a limited.

MURRAY: Limited nuclear war, absolutely; and I'm not alone of course in that opinion, as you know.

CHILDS: No, I know. Well, take the situation in Berlin where we have the greatest crisis in the world today. Do you think the situation in Berlin is likely to develop into a limited atomic war?

MURRAY: I don't know. I have no way to judge that situation, of course. It depends on the various actions. The President of course has ruled out a ground war in Berlin, and he said -- I don't want to misquote him, -- but in effect he said the only war that we could face today is an all-out atomic war, and that's unthinkable; so therefore we drop back to conventional weapons, I assume.

CHILDS: A limited atomic war in Germany would devastate the whole German nation.

MURRAY: Not necessarily, oh no.

CHILDS: Well, I mean---

MURRAY: Limited atomic war is a war that can be limited. It can be discriminating. Weapons can be built and should be stockpiled, to limit the devastation, for instance, from one bomb to, say, a square mile.

CHILDS: Well, I was just judging on Operation Sagebrush.

MURRAY: Well, lots of things have happened since Operation Sagebrush.

BROOKS: Mr. Murray, you suggested that future testing be conducted underground. Can you suggest a suitable location for that kind of testing?

MURRAY: Testing of this nature could be done almost anywhere.

BROOKS: Without danger of contamination?

MURRAY: Without danger of contamination, yes.

BROOKS: Do you think we can learn all we need to learn by confining the tests to underground?

MURRAY: I do.

FINNEY: Mr. Murray, I'd like to clarify one comment you made earlier. You said that the Russians were not stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Do you mean that?

MURRAY: If I did, I didn't mean to. I want to correct that?

FINNEY: That's what I understood you to say.

MURRAY: Oh no, the Russians have without doubt weapons of mass destruction.

FINNEY: Now getting back to the test ban issue, you've accused the Administration of following a policy of retreat on the test ban issue. That's a very serious charge. I wonder if you can tell us how and where and when the Administration has retreated on this?

MURRAY: Well, I think I could point up the Geneva situation that's developed within the last year. Our proposition at Geneva when we first went there was that we would have a moratorium for one year, but that moratorium was going to be dependent on other things happening such as the establishment and the installation of an adequate inspection system, and progress in disarmament. We have dropped those last two points, and that is one area of retreat. A second area of retreat was the consideration of the Macmillan proposal. The Macmillan proposal is one of the worst instances of retreat that I know in this whole nuclear test picture.

FINNEY: Well now, if you were a General here, to stop this policy or retreat, what would you do?

MURRAY: The thing I would do would be to advocate to the Administration that it continue its policy of retreat, but in the other direction, and go back to Pres. Eisenhower's April 13th proposal which was that the first step and the only safe and logical step is to limit the test ban to atmospheric tests. We've had nine or ten years' experience in that field and we are certain that there's no danger to the national security if such a proposition is adopted.

FINNEY: And continue tests in all other realms?

MURRAY: And continue tests in all other realms until such time as we can develop in conjunction with the Russians and others, effective means to detect other types of explosions such as underground explosions.

FINNEY: What would you do October 31st, this coming October 31, when the moratorium runs out, presuming we've not reached agreement by then? Would you resume tests?

MURRAY: I surely would. I think it's important to the national security. And I feel -- if I may go on -- if tests aren't resumed I am fearful that this nation will become a second-rate nuclear nation.

WILSON: Mr. Murray, have you presented these views to President Eisenhower?

MURRAY: Not the most recent views, no. But I've been in communication with President Eisenhower on this question of tests for five or six years.

WILSON: And he appears to take a contrary view.

MURRAY: His action in establishing the unilateral moratorium is evidence of that.

WILSON: Evidence he takes a contrary view. As I understand it, you are opposed to a continued moratorium on tests because you want to develop these smaller weapons. Would you describe what it is you wish to see developed? What kind of weapon specifically, in detail -- since you don't feel there's any real issue of secrecy here.

MURRAY: Well, we have the large weapons, and, as many generals and admirals have stated, we have enough large weapons to destroy Russia many times over. I think therefore that the emphasis should now be put on the lower end of the weapons spectrum. We need small nuclear weapons, so that we will have an adequate stockpile to meet any contingency that might arise.

WILSON: What kind of weapons, in detail?

MURRAY: In detail -- I can't give you the details, naturally. But I tell you that I recommended, and others have recommended, that we stockpile tens of thousands of these small weapons.

WILSON: Small enough to be fired from a bazooka?

MURRAY: They might be fired from the so-called Davy Crockett; that is, from a bazooka.

WILSON: Not from a rifle, actually?

MURRAY: Not from a rifle, no.

SPIVAK: Mr. Murray, are you sure that we don't have these small weapons? I believe that the Administration said two years ago that we are developing and we were manufacturing a great many of these small weapons.

MURRAY: Well, you'd have to be a little more specific when you say "developing," and "great numbers." I say that we haven't the tens of thousands of small weapons that I've been urging for sometime.

SPIVAK: Well, do you assume this, or do you know that?

MURRAY: I know it.

SPIVAK: What do you think we've gained -- we've stopped testing since October 31. What do you think the world has gained by that, or what do you think the world has lost by that?

MURRAY: I think our political gains have been zero. The losses that we have incurred may be very, very serious. We have shut down our test program for eight months; and we intend to hold it down for at least a year. I personally don't believe that when October 31 comes around we will ever resume testing, unless some real dramatic action is taken.

SPIVAK: Do you think the situation is serious enough so that we ought to resume testing at once our underground weapons?

MURRAY: Absolutely. Let me try to explain that a little more in detail. As you recall, we had what we called the A-bomb development. I call that the first generation of weapons. We moved in 1952 to what I call a second generation of weapons -- the hydrogen generation. A weapon thousands of times more destructive than the A-bomb. Now I'm looking forward to a third generation of weapons, not big weapons, but weapons that would be discriminating - personnel weapons. That is the type of nuclear war that could be fought legitimately in the future.

CHILDS: Both on this program today and in your report, Mr. Murray, you've talked about the public ignorance of these matters and the tragedy that the public doesn't know about this nuclear debate. Do you put some of the blame for this on the former chairman of the commission, Mr. Lewis Strauss, whom you had some arguments with?

MURRAY: No, I don't want to direct all the blame on him. I think the National Security Council and the Administration generally are to blame for this.

CHILDS: But you think there has been excessive secrecy?

MURRAY: I do.

CHILDS: What would you do about that, Mr. Murray?

MURRAY: I would try to do everything I could to educate the public in this nuclear field. One of the suggestions I made, and I made some years ago, was that we ought to take 10,000 or 20,000 people out to Eniwetok and have a summit meeting there. The public ought to know the position we're in today in the nuclear weapons field.

CHILDS: And you'd take the secrecy label off a lot of this stuff, would you?

MURRAY: I surely would.

FINNEY: To your knowledge has the Strategic Air Command ever determined how many people could be killed by fallout throughout the world in an all-out attack?

MURRAY: I don't have that information, Mr. Finney.

FINNEY: Have they ever told you in briefing?

MURRAY: No.

WILSON: You've made a very serious charge, Mr. Murray. Who is to blame for this?

MURRAY: Well, I don't think you can pin the blame on any particular person. If I were putting the blame any place I would blame it on technology and the Bureau of the Budget. Some time ago I was discussing, for instance, the effect of dropping a 20-megaton bomb-----

BROOKS: Mr. Murray, I'm sorry but I'm going to have to interrupt. Thank you very much for being with us, Mr. Murray. We'll return to Meet the Press in just a moment. Now here's our announcer.
